The Charleston Daily Mail published an interesting article today that illustrates the difficulty of meeting technology needs in a political climate.  The article explains that much of the $126 million in federal stimulus money leveraged for broadband is going to Verizon to build something being characterized as the “middle mile.”  The “middle mile” will get close enough to rural communities that other companies will step in to build out the “last mile” to customers’ homes and businesses, or so the theory goes.  And guess what?  Verizon will own the “middle mile” circuits that the federal government is paying $126 million to install.

Is that wrong?  Something doesn’t seem right, but I am unsure.  Some thoughts and then a history lesson:

First, the thoughts:

• A lot of money will have been wasted if no one actually installs the “last mile,” but it’s possible that the “middle mile” truly is a larger barrier to broadband access than the “last mile.”  I do not know.
• Why would the State turn over millions of dollars worth of infrastructure paid for with federal dollars for free?  Strangely, this is the public sector equivalent of Dow’s $10 million “gift,” but makes far less business sense than Dow’s financial move.  Why not at least put the new network infrastructure out for bid to see if someone thinks it has a value of more than $0 and then use any funds generated for additional broadband expansion?
• While I question the choice of Verizon, I do realize that it is easier (but possibly not cheaper) to deal with Verizon, the telecommunications Goliath, than a large group of Davids like FiberNet, CityNet and Ntelos.

Second, a history lesson: In the late 1990s, Verizon convinced State government leaders that the wave of the future was asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) technology.  So the State ponied up $1.5 million per year for all kinds of educational institutions and state government agencies to get the new ATM circuits through the WV2001 Project.  Verizon effectively wanted to hedge its ATM bet, and the State of West Virginia was more than happy to comply.  But guess what?  ATM were not the wave of the future.  Verizon and its partner the State of West Virginia bet wrong.

Why was the State happy to comply with Verizon’s request?  Verizon is very powerful politically, and no one, including skeptical state technology officials, were about to stand in its way.  Given the powerful technology interests out there and their willingness to use their political power for financially beneficial ends (and I don’t blame them for that nor expect them to behave any differently) and given the large amounts of money spent by the State on technology, we need technology agencies that are very stable and insulated from political influence.  In 2000, then Chief Technology Officer Sam Tully thought that entity was WVNET and transferred control of much of the State’s telecommunications infrastructure to WVNET.

The rarely-studied lessons of history are intriguing.

I think technology is readily understandable if you focus first on the “what,” and then on the “how.”  The State of West Virginia has lost millions of dollars because people didn’t take the time to figure out technology basics.  Indeed the very first thing I did when I came to state government in 2001 was unravel a multi-million dollar technology debacle.  Despite the terrible circumstances, I had a wonderful opportunity to meet outstanding technology people in various corners of K-12, higher education, and state government, including several extremely helpful WVNET staffers.

As for today, WVNET does far more than I possibly could describe here – and light years more than you’re reading in the news articles and reports discussing WVNET.  By way of illustration:

• WVNET supports institutions’ Sungard Banner data systems to various degrees.  Sungard Banner is back office software for our colleges and includes student record, financial aid, and finance modules, just to name a few.
• WVNET hosts WebCT for numerous institutions.  WebCT is higher education’s primary distance learning system.
• WVNET supports K-12 and others with internet and other comparable services and ensures that K-12 maximizes e-rate discounts (federal discounts provided thanks in significant part to Senator Rockefeller, by the way).
• WVNET manages significant segments of the state telecommunications infrastructure, which combines K-12, higher education, state government and other technology traffic.  K-12 is the largest user, followed by higher education, followed by state government.
• WVNET serves as WVU’s major back-up site and provides similar services for others.
• WVNET coordinates cross-institutional procurements.

While I could continue with my list, the real issue is that each service that WVNET provides needs to be analyzed thoroughly: (1) What is provided? (2) For whom is it provided? (3) At what cost?  (4) Does someone else provide the same service?  (5) Is it something that’s needed, and will it be needed in two years/five years? (6) Is the charge reasonable and could the services be obtained elsewhere more cheaply? (7) Are there other economies of scale that should be taken into consideration?

A thorough analysis, I am sure, would find things that should change, but it also would find that WVNET provides important services that are not readily replaceable, particularly by smaller institutions. Although the proposals to shut down WVNET have been on the frontburner for a long time, nobody has undertaken a thorough analysis of WVNET’s portfolio of services.  And until they do, no one can argue effectively that WVNET should be shut down, moved, or merged.

Finally, any analysis of WVNET should address the significant logistical challenges and costs involved in a move.  On the logistics front, WVNET has a lot of equipment and circuits that must somehow be transferred seamlessly if higher education, K-12 and state government in West Virginia are not to come to a grinding halt.  (Insert joke about whether anyone would notice here.  But the truth is they would.)  This probably means creating additional redundancy in advance of a move. On the cost front, it is possible that significant moving costs should be incurred for the greater good, but those costs will be far more significant than political and education leaders currently realize.

I have been critical of late of many poorly-thought-out plans for major change.  The WVNET proposal provides yet another case in point.  Fortunately, the House of Delegates appears poised to make higher education perform its due diligence before tearing WVNET asunder.

It’s hard for me to imagine anything in politics funnier than the West Virginia Higher Education Policy Commission’s repeated efforts to throw WVNET overboard one minute and then make a 180 degree turn the next.

Before anyone does anything with WVNET, it would be a good idea if someone learned what it truly does.  The statements I’ve been reading in print miss the mark rather dramatically.  Equally important, someone needs to learn about the telecommunications infrastructure going into the WVNET site … and, while they’re at it, whose emails cross its servers.  Finally, there’s one last thing people should know, but they’ll have to look to others for the answer.  Technology is not all that complicated.

UPDATE: 10 March 2010 @ 11:47 AM.  As requested, I edited the first link so that it takes you to the document to which I was referring.  I must say that I am amazed by the number of views of this post.  I passed the previous record for most views in an entire day before 9:00 AM this morning and am very close to the “double” mark now.